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 OPINION 
                      
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Linan-Faye Construction Company Co., Inc. ("Linan-
Faye"), a public housing contractor, appeals from orders of the 
district court that granted summary judgment for the Housing 
Authority of the City of Camden ("HACC") on Linan-Faye's claims 
under public contract law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Because the 
district court erred in applying federal common law rather than 
state law to resolve this dispute, we will reverse and remand to 
the district court for further proceedings.  Nevertheless, since 
we conclude that in the absence of New Jersey law which 
specifically interprets "termination for convenience" clauses New 
Jersey courts would look to federal common law for guidance, we 
will limit the triable issues on remand to a determination of: 
(1) the definition of "work performed" for purposes of paragraph 
17 of Linan-Faye's contract with HACC; (2) the pre-termination 
expenses incurred by Linan-Faye that may be compensable as "work 
performed" under paragraph 17 of the contract; and (3) HACC's 
liability, if any, for damages resulting from HACC's withholding 
of Linan-Faye's performance bond after termination.  Finally, 
because the district court did not err in determining that Linan-
Faye failed to demonstrate a protectible property or liberty 
interest sufficient to support its § 1983 claim, we will affirm 
the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim. 
 
  
 I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 On August 11, 1988, HACC advertised for bids on a 
housing modernization project.  The project involved the 
renovation and rehabilitation of 244 housing units and was to be 
funded in substantial part by a grant from the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development pursuant to the 
Public and Indian Housing Comprehensive Improvement Assistance 
Program ("CIAP").  Plaintiff, Linan-Faye, attended all required 
pre-bid meetings and submitted a bid of $4,264,000, together with 
supporting documentation which included a bid bond, performance 
bond, qualification statement, and required affidavits.  Linan-
Faye was the lowest responsible bidder for the job, underbidding 
its nearest competitor by $600,000.  Accordingly, HACC informed 
Linan-Faye that the contract was to be forthcoming. 
 Linan-Faye engaged in preparatory activities in 
connection with the contract, including meeting with prospective 
subcontractors, job planning and pricing, talking with relevant 
inspectors, and securing insurance.  Also, on several occasions, 
representatives of Linan-Faye met with HACC and its architect to 
discuss specifications and make preparations for the commencement 
of physical construction.  Linan-Faye, however, never began 
physical construction because numerous disputes broke out between 
the parties over interpretation of the specifications. 
 Linan-Faye contends that HACC demanded concessions 
before permitting work to begin.  HACC maintains that the parties 
  
arrived at different interpretations of the project plans and 
specifications, and this conflict became evident at pre-
construction meetings.  On November 29, 1988, as the result of 
these disputes, HACC advised Linan-Faye that it was going to 
rebid the project.  Linan-Faye filed suit to enjoin this 
rebidding and allow it to complete the project as bid. 
 The district court entered a temporary restraining 
order to prevent HACC from accepting further bids.  Subsequently, 
the court approved a Stipulation of Settlement and Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice, under which the parties agreed to 
execute the contract and proceed with the project as originally 
planned.  Nevertheless, disputes soon broke out again. 
 On November 22, 1989, HACC issued a Notice to Proceed.  
Linan-Faye contends that the notice was limited to an order to 
correct certain plumbing problems that were a portion of the 
original contract.  Linan-Faye refused to proceed in a piecemeal 
fashion, and insisted that it would not begin work until a 
certain number of vacant buildings were available at the same 
time so that it could achieve economies of scale.  HACC responded 
that it had scattered vacant units available, but not rows of 
units. 
 Subsequently, HACC attempted first to extract the 
plumbing segment from the contract and, when that failed, 
proposed a complete buy-out of Linan-Faye's contract.  The 
parties entertained the possibility of a buy-out until July of 
  
1990, at which time HUD informed HACC that it would not approve a 
buy-out.  HACC reinstated the previous Notice to Proceed by 
letter dated July 23, 1990.   
 At a preconstruction meeting on September 6, 1990, 
Linan-Faye informed HACC that it would not start work until the 
contract price was increased to reflect the costs incurred by the 
delay in commencing construction.  HACC responded that Linan-Faye 
had to begin work before it would address the issue of the price 
increase.   
 HACC elected to terminate Linan-Faye's contract by  
letter dated September 25, 1990.  In that letter, Gregory Kern, 
the Interim Executive Director of HACC, stated that HACC would 
instruct the Modernization Office to assist Linan-Faye in 
reclaiming its performance bonds.  While the letter did not 
mention the terms "breach" or "default," it did state that Linan-
Faye "had continually failed to demonstrate its intent to perform 
under the public contract."  Letter from Kern to Norman Faye 
(September 25, 1990); App. Vol. I at 114-115.  HACC confirmed its 
decision to terminate by letter dated October 23, 1990. 
   Linan-Faye objected to the termination and filed the instant 
action on October 26, 1990, setting forth theories of recovery 
under New Jersey public contracts law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Linan-Faye served HACC with a complaint in December of 1990 
seeking specific performance and damages.  HACC did not surrender 
Linan-Faye's performance bond until July of 1991, after the 
  
district court determined that specific performance was not 
available to Linan-Faye. 
 In April of 1992, HACC filed a motion for summary 
judgment on Linan-Faye's civil rights claim and for the first 
time argued, in that same motion, that the "termination for 
convenience" clause set forth in paragraph 17 of the General 
Conditions of their contract limited Linan-Faye's damages under 
the contract.1  The district court granted HACC's motion for 
                     
1
.  Paragraph 17 of this contract's General Conditions of the 
Contract for Construction states in relevant part: 
 
 a.  Subject to the approval of HUD, the performance of work 
under this contract may be terminated by the PHA in 
accordance with this paragraph in whole, or from time 
to time in part, whenever the Contracting Officer shall 
determine that such termination is in the best interest 
of the PHA.  Any such termination shall be effected by 
delivery to the Contractor of a Notice of Termination 
specifying the extent to which the performance of the 
work under the contract is terminated, and the date 
upon which such termination becomes effective. 
 
 b. If the performance of the work is terminated, either in 
whole or in part, the PHA shall be liable to the 
Contractor for reasonable and proper costs resulting 
from such termination, which costs shall be paid to the 
Contractor within 90 days of receipt by the PHA of a 
properly presented claim setting out in detail: (1) the 
total cost of the work performed to date of termination 
less the total amount of contract payments made to the 
contractor . . .; and (5) an amount constituting a 
reasonable profit on the value of work performed by the 
Contractor. 
 
App. Vol. II at 45. 
 
 
  
summary judgment on the § 1983 claim, but deferred decision on 
the effect of the termination of convenience clause pending 
further discovery. 
 Upon a renewed motion for summary judgment, the 
district court held for HACC, determining that Linan-Faye's 
damages would be limited to those compensable under the 
contract's termination for convenience clause.  The district 
court left open, however, the possibility of recovery for damages 
accruing from HACC's initial failure to identify specifically the 
termination as one of convenience. 
 HACC filed its third motion for summary judgment on 
October 27, 1993.  In that motion, HACC contended that since 
Linan-Faye never began work under the contract, it could not 
recover any damages under the termination for convenience clause.  
Linan-Faye responded that it could recover damages for: (1) 
preparatory costs such as soliciting subcontractors, pricing, and 
pre-construction meetings; (2) improper notice of termination; 
(3) pre-termination delay by HACC; and (4) HACC's refusal to 
relinquish Linan-Faye's performance bond.  Determining that 
federal common law applied in interpreting this contract, the 
district court held that Linan-Faye incurred no compensable 
damages under the termination for convenience clause.  The court, 
therefore, entered an order granting summary judgment for HACC.  
This appeal followed. 
  
 Following oral argument before this Court, HACC and 
Linan-Faye agreed to participate in non-binding mediation of the 
controversy before the Honorable Max Rosenn, Senior Circuit 
Judge.  By memorandum dated November 9, 1994, Judge Rosenn 
informed us that efforts to reach a settlement of the controversy 
through mediation were unsuccessful.    
 
 II. JURISDICTION & OVERVIEW OF ISSUES RAISED IN THIS APPEAL 
 The district court exercised jurisdiction in this 
matter by virtue of the diversity of citizenship of the parties 
with the requisite amount in controversy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332 (1988).  This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 (1988).  Linan-Faye essentially raises six issues on 
appeal:2 (1) whether the district court erred in applying  
federal common law and not the law of New Jersey to interpret 
this contract; (2) whether New Jersey law precludes retroactive 
application of a termination for convenience clause; (3) whether 
the district court was correct in its application of the 
constructive termination for convenience doctrine; (4) whether 
the district court erred by engaging in impermissible fact 
                     
2
.  Linan-Faye styles its appeal as containing seven issues.  
Brief of Appellant at ix-x.  The first of these issues, according 
to Linan-Faye, is that the district court engaged in 
impermissible fact finding on contested matters.  Given our 
conclusion concerning the application of the termination for 
convenience clause, however, this issue is best resolved in 
conjunction with a discussion of the proper application of that 
clause.  See discussion infra part VI. 
  
finding so as to deny Linan-Faye all compensation; (5) whether 
Linan-Faye has an actionable claim for violation of its civil 
rights; and (6) whether HACC's position that the termination for 
convenience clause denies any recovery is barred by principles of 
equitable and judicial estoppel. 
 
 III. CHOICE OF LAW 
 Linan-Faye contends that the district court erred in 
applying federal common law and not the law of New Jersey to 
resolve this dispute.  According to Linan-Faye, this action 
involves a contract dispute between a private contractor and an 
autonomous public housing authority created pursuant to New 
Jersey law.  Where such parties enter federal court based upon 
diversity of citizenship, Linan-Faye argues, the federal courts 
presumptively apply state law.  See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64, 78, 58 S. Ct. 817, 822 (1938).  We agree. 
 Our review of a district court's determination as to 
choice of law is plenary.  Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership v. 
Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Universal 
Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 
1981)).  This Court's recent decision in Virgin Islands Housing 
Authority v. Coastal General Construction Services Corp., 27 F.3d 
911 (3d Cir. 1994), strongly indicates the proper result in this 
case.  In Coastal General, we determined, in the context of 
deciding a question of federal jurisdiction, that local law, not 
  
federal law, governs a dispute over the termination provisions of 
a contract between a public housing authority and a private 
construction company.  Id. at 917.  As we stated in Coastal 
General, "[t]he fact that a contract is subject to federal 
regulation does not, in itself, demonstrate that Congress meant 
that all aspects of its performance or nonperformance are to be 
governed by federal law rather than state law applicable to 
similar contracts in businesses not under federal regulation."  
Id. at 916 (quoting Lindy v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 1367, 1369 (3d Cir. 
1974)).  In addition, we explained that even if the contractor's 
complaint contained assertions respecting the use of federal 
funds in a construction project and the adoption of contractual 
forms authorized by HUD, there would be no difference in outcome.  
Id. at 917. 
 Similar to Coastal General, in the instant case a 
public housing authority contracted with a private construction 
company.  Linan-Faye, the construction company, did not contract 
directly with the United States government.  While HUD funded the 
construction project in part, and HUD forms were used in the 
contract, Coastal General teaches that these facts do not dictate 
application of federal common law.  Rather, the holding of 
Coastal General indicates that in construing termination clauses 
such as the one at issue in this case, courts must look to local 
law.  Thus, the district court was incorrect in applying federal 
common law and not the law of New Jersey to resolve this dispute.  
  
 The district court erred in deviating from the 
generally applicable Erie doctrine.  The Supreme Court, in Boyle 
v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 108 S. Ct. 2510 
(1988), set forth a two-pronged inquiry for determining whether 
to apply federal common law in the absence of an express 
Congressional grant of such authority.  According to the Supreme 
Court, a court must first determine whether the action involves 
"`uniquely federal interests.'"  Id. at 504, 108 S. Ct. at 2514 
(citing Texas Industries Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 
U.S. 630, 640, 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2067 (1981)).  Once a court 
identifies a uniquely federal interest, the court must then 
determine whether a "significant conflict" exists between an 
identifiable "federal policy or interest and the [operation] of 
state law."  Id. at 507, 108 S. Ct. at 2516 (quoting Wallis v. 
Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68, 86 S. Ct. 1301, 
1304 (1966)). 
 Relying on American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1961), and United 
States v. Taylor, 333 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1964), the district 
court concluded that the government's interest in ensuring a 
uniform interpretation of the termination for convenience 
provisions in this contract provided the "significant federal 
interest" necessary to pre-empt state law.  Linan-Faye 
Construction Co. v. Housing Authority of Camden, 847 F. Supp. 
1191, 1197 (D.N.J. 1994).  These cases, however, do not dictate 
  
this result.  While both of these cases applied federal law in 
interpreting a contract, the government interest was far more 
significant in those cases than in the case at hand.  In American 
Pipe & Steel, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated, 
"we agree generally with appellee that the construction of 
subcontracts, let under prime contracts connected with the 
national security, should be regulated by a uniform federal law."  
American Pipe & Steel, 292 F.2d at 644.  The instant case 
involves no matter of national security.  Further, the court in 
American Pipe & Steel expressly acknowledged that the development 
of the law in this area was "still uncertain and unclear."  Id.  
Similarly, in Taylor, the contract at issue involved the 
construction of an atomic energy plant, a matter intricately 
involved with national security during the 1950's and 1960's.  
Taylor, 333 F.2d at 635.  The Taylor court also explicitly 
referred to the fact that American Pipe & Steel dictated 
application of federal common law in such a case.  Id. at 637.  
Thus, both of these decisions concerned matters of national 
security that are simply not present in this case.3 
                     
3
.  Still another distinction exists between the instant case and 
the cases the district court relied upon in applying federal 
common law to interpret this contract.  American Pipe & Steel and 
Taylor involved direct United States government procurement 
contracts, or a subcontract with a United States government prime 
contractor.  American Pipe & Steel, 292 F.2d at 641; Taylor, 333 
F.2d at 635. Neither of these situations involved, as is the case 
here, the outright grant of funds to a public agency.  The closer 
nexus to the United States government in American Pipe & Steel 
and Taylor heightens the federal government's interest.  The 
weaker link in this case diminishes the significance of the 
  
 Moreover, the district court erred in finding a 
conflict between federal and state law that would endanger any 
federal interest involved.  The district court correctly 
recognized the proposition that a lawsuit which involves a 
federal interest is a "necessary, not a sufficient, condition for 
the displacement of state law."  Linan-Faye Construction Co., 847 
F. Supp. at 1198 (quoting Boyle 487 U.S. at 507, 108 S. Ct. at 
2516).  The court, however, failed to identify a significant 
conflict.  In the only paragraph that attempts to identify a 
conflict, the court stated: 
 We find it implausible that the federal government 
would require all CIAP contracts in excess of 
$10,000.00 to contain a termination for convenience 
clause, and then leave interpretation of that clause to 
the vagaries of state law, particularly where, like New 
Jersey, there are few or no state law cases 
interpreting this type of provision.  Rather, we 
believe that the decision to include a termination for 
convenience clause in the "Uniform Requirements" 
section of the C.F.R. reflects a federal interest in a 
consistent interpretation of that clause. 
Id. 
 The first sentence of this paragraph merely assumes the 
answer to the question the court is wrestling with: whether 
Congress left interpretation of clauses in these types of 
contracts to state law.  The second sentence of the above quoted 
(..continued) 
government interest.  Thus, the district court was incorrect in 
finding a government interest significant enough to warrant 
deviating from Erie and applying federal common law. 
  
paragraph simply reidentifies the interest involved, it does not 
point out a conflict with state law. 
 The problem with the district court's reasoning is 
highlighted by its own analysis of what the outcome would be 
under state law.  The court states, "[e]ven assuming that New 
Jersey law were to apply, we have no basis for believing that New 
Jersey courts would look elsewhere than to federal common law for 
guidance."  Id.  If New Jersey courts, as is likely, would look 
to federal common law to decide this question for which there is 
little state law precedent on point, then the court is incorrect 
in its assertion that a conflict exists.  The outcome would be 
the same under both federal and state common law.  Thus, the 
court erred in applying federal common law and not the law of New 
Jersey to resolve this dispute and we must reverse with the 
direction that the district court resolve all remaining issues in 
accordance with New Jersey law. 
 
 
 IV. NEW JERSEY LAW 
 Having decided that it is the law of New Jersey that 
governs the interpretation of this contract, we must now decide 
whether Linan-Faye is correct when it argues that the general 
principles of contract damages under New Jersey law would permit 
Linan-Faye to recover full expectation damages under this 
contract rather than those damages provided for under the 
  
contract's termination for convenience clause.  Citing A-S 
Development, Inc. v. W.R. Grace Land Corp., 537 F.Supp. 549, 557 
(D.N.J. 1982), aff'd 707 F.2d 1388 (3d Cir. 1983), and other 
cases,4 Linan-Faye states that under New Jersey law one who 
breaches an agreement must compensate the injured party in order 
to put the non-breaching party in as good a position as he would 
have been in had performance been rendered as promised.  Further, 
Linan-Faye argues that New Jersey courts have declined to import 
federal procurement concepts into their contract law 
jurisprudence. See Edwin J. Dobson, Jr., Inc. v. Rutgers, 157 
N.J. Super. 357, 418, 384 A.2d 1121, 1152 n.10 (1978) ("The 
policy factors that have lead [sic] to the development of this 
concept in federal contracts, such as a need to expand or abandon 
a particular arms program with consequent economic impact on 
contractors and subcontractors, do not warrant state courts 
adopting it wholesale by judicial fiat when traditional remedies 
for breach of contract are available."), aff'd sub nom., Broadway 
Maintenance Corp. v. Rutgers, 180 N.J. Super. 350, 434 A.2d 1125 
(A.D. 1981), aff'd, 90 N.J. 253, 447 A.2d 906 (1982).   While the 
cases Linan-Faye cites stand for these general propositions, such 
                     
4
.  Linan-Faye also cites Donovan v. Bachstadt, 91 N.J. 434, 453 
A.2d 160 (1982), for the proposition stated above.  Further, 
Linan-Faye cites In Re Merritt Logan, Inc., 901 F.2d 349, 357-58 
(3d Cir. 1990) and Sandler v. Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equipment 
Corp., 141 N.J. Super. 437, 454, 358 A.2d 805 (A.D.), 
certification denied, 71 N.J. 503, 366 A.2d 658 (1976), for the 
proposition that the courts of New Jersey have long maintained a 
liberal rule of damages to a non-breaching party. 
  
generalities provide insufficient guidance in deciding the proper 
construction of a contract that contains a termination for 
convenience clause.5 
 It is undisputed that there are no cases in New Jersey 
construing the effect of termination for convenience clauses.  It 
is also undisputed that there are numerous federal cases dealing 
specifically with termination for convenience clauses and, in 
particular, with the doctrine of constructive termination for 
convenience.  Therefore, as the district court stated, "courts in 
New Jersey would recognize that where the parties have 
incorporated a particular clause pursuant to federal regulation, 
they do so against the backdrop of federal case law addressing 
the clause."  Linan-Faye Construction Co., 847 F. Supp. at 1198.  
Accordingly, we align ourselves with the district court in its 
determination that if New Jersey law were to apply, New Jersey 
courts would look to this rich body of federal common law 
concerning the termination for convenience doctrine, unless to do 
so would violate some enshrined principle of New Jersey law.  Id.  
Like the district court, we are unable to discern such a 
principle.6 
                     
5
.  Additionally, the quoted language in Dobson represents only 
the opinion of a single judge on this matter.  The relevant issue 
was not addressed in the New Jersey Supreme Court opinion 
affirming this case. 
6
.  Linan-Faye argues that decisions of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court such as W.V. Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey Dept. of 
Transportation, 116 N.J. 543, 562 A.2d 222 (1989), where the 
court has found against governmental entities, are inconsistent 
  
 
 V. TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE 
 Because the New Jersey Supreme Court would likely look 
to federal common law as persuasive authority in order to 
construe this contract's termination for convenience clause, we 
must examine the parties' contentions in light of the relevant 
federal case law.7  As a preliminary matter, we must determine 
the method HACC used to terminate Linan-Faye.  HACC argues that 
it terminated Linan-Faye by letter of September 25, 1990, and 
this letter constituted a termination for convenience.  Linan-
Faye, on the other hand, argues that this letter constituted a 
default termination.  Linan-Faye has the better of this argument. 
(..continued) 
with the broad discretion federal courts have conferred on the 
government in cases concerning termination for convenience 
clauses.  Pangborne, however, involved a failure of a 
governmental entity to deal in good faith.  Id. at 562, 562 A.2d 
at 231 ("DOT's failure . . . to deal expressly and clearly with 
this material term constitutes a breach of an implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing and the supervening obligation of the 
government to deal scrupulously with the public.").  Federal 
common law also looks disfavorably on the government in cases of 
governmental bad faith.  See infra Part V.  Therefore, Linan-
Faye's argument is unpersuasive. 
7
.  We recognize that the district court also applied federal 
common law to resolve this dispute.  Linan-Faye Construction Co. 
847 F. Supp. at 1198.  Nevertheless, there is a difference 
between looking to federal common law as persuasive authority and 
being bound by federal law.  The district court opted for the 
latter approach and determined that construction of the 
termination for convenience clause was purely a matter of federal 
common law.  In light of our previous holding in Coastal General, 
27 F.3d at 917, we opt for the former approach.    
  
 HACC's letter of September 25, 1990 is replete with 
references to defaults on the part of Linan-Faye.  HACC stated in 
the letter that Linan-Faye's correspondence evidences Linan-
Faye's "intent to avoid compliance with the specifications."  
Letter from HACC to Norman Faye (September 25, 1990);  App. Vol. 
I at 114.  Further, HACC stated in its letter that Linan-Faye had 
"continually failed to demonstrate its intent to perform under 
the public contract" and that "it is clear" Linan-Faye is "no 
closer to performing its contract obligations then it was in 
September of 1988."  Id. at 114, 115.  Nowhere in this letter 
does HACC state that it is terminating Linan-Faye simply for 
convenience.  It is apparent from this document that HACC 
originally terminated Linan-Faye for default.8 
 Given HACC's original termination of Linan-Faye for 
default, the question that we must reach is whether the court 
should retroactively convert this termination for default into a 
                     
8
.  HACC argues that the last paragraph of this letter which 
states that HACC has "instructed the Modernization Office to 
assist [Linan-Faye] as needed in obtaining release of [Linan-
Faye's Bond]," App. at 115, is inconsistent with a default 
termination because if HACC had terminated for a default it was 
entitled to hold onto the bond.  Just because HACC had the right 
to hold onto the bond under the contract, however, does not mean 
that it intended to exercise this right at the time of the 
letter.  HACC may not have felt that the defaults it cited, such 
as a failure to begin work, were compensable via the bond, or it 
may have decided that it did not wish to encourage litigation 
over the bond issue.  In any event, this paragraph provides 
insufficient support for HACC's argument that this letter 
constituted a termination for convenience. 
  
termination for convenience.  HACC argues, based on a number of 
cases from the United States Court of Claims and the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit,9 that the district court did not 
err in invoking the constructive termination for convenience 
doctrine in order to convert this default termination into a 
termination for the convenience of the Housing Authority.  Linan-
Faye argues that under federal common law the doctrine of 
constructive termination for convenience has no application to 
this case.  According to Linan-Faye, Federal Acquisition 
Regulations (FAR's) applicable to direct procurement contracts 
provide for a "conversion clause," a clause that automatically 
converts a termination for default into a termination for 
convenience.  48 C.F.R. § 49.401(b) (1993).  Linan-Faye suggests, 
therefore, that because no such regulations exist in grant 
situations10 such as this, there is an expressed intent that such 
a conversion not be allowed.  We find Linan-Faye's argument 
unpersuasive. 
                     
9
.  See discussion infra this part. 
10
.  HACC received a grant pursuant to the Public and Indian 
Housing Comprehensive Improvement Assistance Program ("CIAP"). 
CIAP grants, which are administered by HUD, require recipients to 
set forth various terms and conditions in their agreements with 
contractors.  24 C.F.R. § 968.110(j) (1994).  The regulations 
concerning CIAP grants, collected at 24 C.F.R. § 85.1 et seq., 
differ from the FAR's applicable to direct government procurement 
contracts.  The CIAP grant regulations do not provide for a 
mandatory conversion clause.   
  
 The absence of a conversion provision in regulations 
concerning CIAP grants does not preclude application of federal 
common law.  While the FAR's have an explicit conversion clause, 
it was the federal common law that originally developed the 
concept of termination for convenience, and later developed the 
concept of constructive termination for convenience.  We find it 
appropriate to apply federal common law. 
 The idea that the government can, under certain 
circumstances, terminate a contract without paying full 
expectation damages, dates from the winding down of military 
procurement following the civil war.  Torncello v. United States, 
681 F.2d 756, 764 (Ct. Cl. 1982).  The termination for 
convenience doctrine originated "in the reasonable recognition 
that continuing with wartime contracts after the war was over 
clearly was against the public interest."  Id.  Where the 
government terminates a private contractor pursuant to a 
termination for convenience clause in a contract, instead of 
receiving full expectation damages the contractor's recovery is 
defined by the termination for convenience clause.  Recovery is 
limited to "`costs incurred, profit based on the work done, and 
the costs of preparing the termination settlement proposal.'"  
Maxima Corp. v. United States, 847 F.2d 1549, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (quoting R. Nash & J. Cibinic, Federal Procurement Law 1104 
(3d ed. 1980))  After World War II, termination for convenience 
  
came to be applied to peacetime non-military procurement.  Id. 
(citing Torncello, 681 F.2d at 765-66). 
  Constructive termination for convenience, an outgrowth 
of termination for convenience, is a judge-made doctrine that 
allows an actual breach by the government to be retroactively 
justified.11  Maxima Corp., 847 F.2d at 1553.  This doctrine has 
its origins in the Supreme Court's decision in College Point Boat 
Corp. v. United States, 267 U.S. 12, 45 S. Ct. 199 (1925).  In 
that decision, the Supreme Court held: 
 A party to a contract who is sued for its breach may 
ordinarily defend on the ground that there existed, at 
the time, a legal excuse for nonperformance by him, 
although he was then ignorant of the fact. He may, 
likewise, justify an asserted termination, rescission, 
or repudiation, of a contract by proving that there 
was, at the time, an adequate cause, although it did 
not become known to him until later. 
College Point, 267 U.S. at 15-16, 45 S. Ct. at 200-01 (footnotes 
omitted) (emphasis added).   
 The decision of the Court of Claims in John Reiner & 
Company v. United States, 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. 
                     
11
.  The "government" involved in these cases is typically the 
United States government.  In the instant case, the entity 
seeking to terminate for convenience is the Housing Authority of 
Camden.  While the doctrine of constructive termination for 
convenience originally developed to allow the United States 
government maximum flexibility to deal with military contractors 
during times of war, the expansion of this doctrine into areas 
other than those involving military contracts suggests that its 
precepts should be applied to all government entities that 
provide services to the public.  Of course, the final word on 
this issue rests with the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
  
denied, 377 U.S. 931, 84 S. Ct. 1332 (1964), demonstrates the 
operation of this doctrine.  In John Reiner, the plaintiff 
contracted with the government to supply generator sets to the 
Army.  Id. at 439.  Following delivery of a written contract, but 
before performance commenced, the government notified the 
plaintiff that the contract was canceled and that the contract 
would be rebid because of an impropriety in the original bidding 
procedure identified by a competitor.  Id.  Nevertheless, no such 
impropriety was found to exist.  Id. at 442.  The Court of 
Claims, therefore, was forced to consider the proper measure of 
damages to the contractor.  In answering this question, the court 
determined that while the government did not rely on the 
termination for convenience clause in canceling the contract with 
the plaintiff, because it could have so relied, the measure of 
damages was limited to the damages provided for in that clause.  
Id. at 443.  According to the court, even though the excuse 
originally offered was not a "valid justification," a "good 
ground did exist in the far-reaching right to terminate under the 
termination article."  Id.  This case granted the government 
great latitude in retroactively terminating contracts for 
convenience. 
 Perhaps the high-water mark of courts' permissiveness 
in allowing the government to terminate for convenience, 
constructively or otherwise, was Colonial Metals Co. v. United 
States, 494 F.2d 1355 (Ct. Cl. 1974), overruled in part by 
  
Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756 (Ct. Cl. 1982).  In that 
case, a dealer in copper contracted with the government to sell 
copper ingot to the Navy.  Id. at 1357.  The government 
terminated this contract to obtain the copper ingot from other 
sources at a cheaper price.  Id.  The court held that even where 
the government knew of the better price elsewhere at the time it 
awarded the contract and then later decided to terminate the 
contract to pursue the better price, in the absence of proof of 
malice or conspiracy, termination was not improper.  Id. at 1361. 
 Termination for convenience, and its expansion into the 
constructive termination for convenience doctrine, however, does 
not confer upon the government a discretion that is unbounded.  
In granting the government the privilege of constructive 
termination for convenience, courts brush up against the problem 
of allowing the government to create an illusory contract.  See 
Torncello, 681 F.2d at 769 (when evaluating a termination for 
convenience, one cannot ignore hornbook law that "a route of 
complete escape vitiates any other consideration furnished and is 
incompatible with the existence of a contract.").  Accordingly, 
courts have articulated limits on the use of the constructive 
termination for convenience doctrine in various ways.  For 
instance, in Torncello the Court of Claims stated that the 
constructive application of a termination for convenience clause 
requires "some kind of change from the circumstances of the 
bargain or in the expectations of the parties"  Id. at 772.  In 
  
Kalvar Corp. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298, 1301 (Ct. Cl. 
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830, 98 S. Ct. 112 (1977), by 
contrast, the court's inquiry into whether to prevent the 
government from receiving the benefit of the termination for 
convenience clause focused on whether the government evidenced 
any bad faith in terminating the contract.  Pointing out that the 
court is required to presume good faith on the part of public 
officials, the court in that case determined that the contractor 
could not avoid the application of the termination for 
convenience clause.  Id. at 1301-02; see also SMS Data Products 
Group, Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 612, 617 (1990) ("This 
court presumes that Government officials act in good faith."). 
 In this matter, the district court concluded that under 
the bad faith test it was proper to allow HACC to invoke the 
doctrine of constructive termination for convenience.  
Additionally, the district court commented that even under the 
changed circumstances test of Torncello, the deterioration in the 
relationship between HACC and Linan-Faye would constitute 
sufficiently changed circumstances to apply this doctrine.  We 
agree with the district court's decision that it was appropriate 
to apply the constructive termination for convenience doctrine in 
this case for two reasons.  First, Linan-Faye has produced 
insufficient evidence of bad faith on the part of HACC to 
overcome the presumption that public officials act in good faith.  
Second, this case is very different from Torncello. 
  
 In Torncello, the government awarded a private 
contractor the right to service all of the Navy's pest control 
needs.  Torncello, 681 F.2d at 758, 762.  However, after awarding 
the contract to this contractor, the Navy called the Department 
of Navy Public Works to perform the task because this 
organization, from its initial bid, appeared to be able to do the 
work cheaper.  Id. at 758.  The government invoked the 
constructive termination for convenience doctrine arguing that 
since it had never called the private contractor to perform any 
actual work, the private contractor was not entitled to any 
damages.  Id. at 759.  Limiting its decision in Colonial Metals, 
the court held, in an opinion joined by only three of six judges, 
that the requirement of the government's good faith is not 
sufficient and that without other checks, free termination for 
convenience is not supportable. Id. at 771.12 
 In the matter at hand, Linan-Faye does not claim that 
HACC terminated its contract to obtain the work at a cheaper 
price.  Linan-Faye also does not claim that HACC terminated the 
contract in order to obtain work from a lower bidder who was 
known to HACC at the time it contracted with Linan-Faye.  Indeed, 
                     
12
.  Notably, the disagreement among the judges in that case was 
on the precise issue of whether it was appropriate to create a 
stricter test for convenience terminations by the government.  
Id. at 773-774 (Friedman, C.J., Davis, J., and Nichols, J. 
concurring)  While all the judges agreed on the result in that 
case, the court could not muster a majority to embrace the new 
"changed circumstances" test. 
  
Linan-Faye points out in its brief that it was the low bidder for 
the project.  Brief of Linan Faye at 1.  Thus, the divisive facts 
presented in Torncello are not present here.     
 Moreover, subsequent cases have limited the scope of 
Torncello.  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, for 
example, has stated that Torncello "stands for the unremarkable 
proposition that when the government contracts with a party 
knowing full well that it will not honor the contract, it cannot 
avoid a breach claim by adverting to the convenience termination 
clause."  Salsbury Industries v. United States, 905 F.2d 1518, 
1521 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024, 111 S. Ct. 
671 (1991); see also T.I. Construction Co. v. Kiewit Eastern Co., 
No. 91-2638, 1992 WL 382306, at *9 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 10, 1992) 
(citing language in Torncello indicating that its holding was 
limited to the facts presented); Modern Systems Technology Corp. 
v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 699, 704 (Cl. Ct. 1992) (applying 
bad faith test and reading Torncello to stand only for the above 
stated proposition), aff'd, 980 F.2d 745 (Fed. Cir 1992).  In 
addition, in a subsequent case, the United States Claims Court 
stated that "Torncello did not change the traditional 
understanding" that the "Government could invoke the clause so 
long as it did not act in bad faith or clearly abuse its 
discretion."  SMS Data Products, 19 Cl. Ct. at 619-20.  In light 
of these developments, and considering the division among the 
court in Torncello, we decline to read that case as significantly 
  
limiting the power of the government in terminating for 
convenience.13 
 As the district court recognized, the post award 
deterioration of the relationship between HACC and Linan-Faye 
which included conflict over the specifications would likely  
constitute sufficiently changed circumstances to justify 
application of the doctrine of constructive termination for 
convenience even under the reasoning in Torncello.  See Embrey v. 
United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 617, 624-25 (1989) (deterioration of 
business relations considered sufficiently changed circumstances 
to allow government to terminate for convenience);  see also SMS 
Data Products, 19 Cl. Ct. at 621 (genuine concern that contractor 
could not meet the contract's mandatory requirements constituted 
changed circumstances).  Without establishing a litmus test as to 
what constitutes changed circumstances, which is unnecessary in 
view of subsequent limits on Torncello, we hold that New Jersey 
courts, looking to federal law as persuasive authority, would 
permit HACC to invoke the constructive termination for 
                     
13
.  Linan-Faye also cites a law review note written shortly 
after the Torncello decision in support of its claims.  Stephen 
N. Young, Note, Limiting the Government's Ability to Terminate 
For Its Convenience Following Tornecello [sic], 52 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 892 (1984).  In that note, the author suggests that 
Torncello provides a reason to eliminate the government's right 
to constructively terminate for convenience.  Id. at 911.  As 
this author was writing without the benefit of recent decisions, 
all that can be said of his recommendation is that future courts 
declined to take the hint.    
  
convenience doctrine in this instance.14  Accordingly, damages 
will be limited by the termination for convenience clause of the 
contract.15 
                     
14
.  The dissent states that the majority "holds that a 
deterioration in business relations, demonstrated in not 
insignificant part by a dispute over specifications, constitutes 
such a change in circumstances."  See infra at 12 (emphasis 
added).  The dissent is incorrect insofar as it reads this to be 
the holding of our decision.  As we have already explained, 
Torncello, and its changed circumstances approach, has been 
sharply limited by more recent cases.  See discussion supra this 
Part.  We have therefore declined to endorse wholeheartedly the 
changed circumstances approach.  Accordingly, an accurate 
statement of our position is that (1) Linan-Faye has not 
demonstrated actual bad faith on the part of HACC and (2) this 
case does not present the divisive facts presented in Torncello 
that warranted finding against the government. 
15
.  At oral argument, Linan-Faye suggested that the application 
of paragraph 16(d) of the General Conditions of this Contract 
"trumps" the constructive application of the paragraph 17 
termination for convenience clause.  Paragraph 16(d) states, in 
pertinent part: 
 
 The Contractor's right to proceed shall not be terminated or 
the Contractor charged with damages under this clause 
if: 
 
 (1) The delay in completing the work arises from 
unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the 
fault or negligence of the Contractor.  Examples of 
such causes include (1) acts of God, or of the public 
enemy, (ii) acts of the PHA or other governmental 
entity in either its sovereign or contractual capacity 
(iii) acts of another contractor in the performance of 
a contract with the PHA (iv) fires . . . . 
 
App. Vol II at 45.  
 
This subsection of paragraph 16 carves out an exception to when 
HACC can terminate for default. 
 While Linan-Faye's argument goes to whether HACC breached 
the agreement in terminating for default, it cannot prevent 
application of the constructive termination for convenience 
  
 VI.  COMPENSATION IN LIGHT OF THE TERMINATION 
  FOR CONVENIENCE CLAUSE 
  Having determined that the termination for convenience 
clause is applicable in this case, we must next decide whether 
the district court erred in granting summary judgment for HACC 
and denying Linan-Faye all compensation.  Linan-Faye contends 
that the district court exceeded its role at the summary judgment 
stage because there still remain six contested issues concerning 
its contract claim.  According to Linan-Faye, the district court 
erred in determining: (1) the definition of "work performed" 
under the contract; (2) there was no evidence of compensable pre-
termination expenses under the contract; (3) the reason why HACC 
retained Linan-Faye's performance bond; (4) that Linan-Faye 
"refused" to begin work; (5) that Linan-Faye misunderstood the 
contract specifications; and (6) that there was proper HUD 
approval of the contract's termination. 
 Our scope of review is plenary in determining the 
propriety of summary judgment.  Oritani Savings & Loan Ass'n v. 
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 989 F.2d 635, 637 (3d Cir. 1993).  
Summary judgment is proper only "if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
(..continued) 
doctrine.  The very premise of the College Boat decision is that 
a party may defend a suit for breach on the grounds that a legal 
excuse existed at the time of the alleged breach.  College Boat, 
267 U.S. at 15-16, 45 S. Ct. 200-01.  Thus, whether HACC breached 
its agreement by terminating the contract for default is largely 
beside the point.     
  
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law."  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986).  Further, at the summary 
judgment stage, "the judge's function is not himself to weigh the 
evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine 
whether there is a genuine issue for trial."  Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986). 
   Three of the issues that Linan-Faye raises are 
genuine issues of material fact in dispute.  The other issues 
concern facts that are either not material, or are not in 
dispute.  We will reverse the decision of the district court 
granting summary judgment on those issues where there is a 
genuine issue of material fact in dispute. 
 
 A.  Definition of "Work Performed" under the Contract  
 Linan-Faye argues that the trial court improperly 
selected isolated phrases from correspondence between the parties 
in its determination that the phrase "work performed" in 
paragraph 17 of the contract16 refers only to "physical 
construction" and not to preparatory work.  The district court 
conceded that the contract documents, which include the 
contract's General Conditions and its Supplement to the Standard 
Form Agreement, failed to define the term "work."  Linan-Faye 
                     
16
.  See supra note 1 for the text of paragraph 17. 
  
Construction Co., 847 F. Supp. at 1206.  Based on an analysis of 
the word "work" as used in several paragraphs of the contract, 
the district court concluded that "work" could not include 
"preparatory work" until after Linan-Faye began physical 
construction on the project.  Id. at 1207.  We conclude that the 
district court erred in determining this disputed issue of fact. 
 Paragraph 8(a) of the General Conditions of this 
contract is the paragraph from which the district court draws the 
most support for its conclusion that "work" under the termination 
for convenience clause does not include "preparatory work."  The 
court's reading of this paragraph, however, is too strained to 
support a grant of summary judgment.  Paragraph 8(a) of the 
General Conditions states: 
 Progress payments will be made at approximately thirty 
(30) day intervals; and in preparing estimates, 
acceptable work in place, material delivered to and 
properly stored on the site, and preparatory work done 
will be taken into consideration.  If the contract 
covers more than one project, a separate estimate shall 
be furnished for each. 
 
App. Vol. II at 42.  From this paragraph, the district court 
deduced that expenses for preparatory work were recoverable only 
if the contractor begins the physical construction required under 
the contract.  Linan-Faye Construction Co., 847 F. Supp. at 1207.  
This conclusion is unjustified. 
 There is nothing in the language of paragraph 8(a) that 
speaks to situations where HACC terminates Linan-Faye for 
convenience after Linan-Faye has performed preparatory work, but 
  
before it has begun physical construction.  If anything, the 
language of this paragraph demonstrates that both parties 
considered preparatory work to be a compensable cost because the 
paragraph states that preparatory work will be taken into 
consideration in preparing estimates for compensation.  Thus, the 
district court erred in concluding that this paragraph is 
dispositive. 
 The district court's survey of numerous other 
paragraphs containing the word "work" also produces inconclusive 
results.  According to the court, paragraph 2 which requires the 
contractor to "furnish all necessary labor, materials, tools, 
equipment, water, light, heat, power, transportation, and 
supervision necessary for performance of the work," and paragraph 
22 which allows the contractor to request from the architect 
drawings "which will [be required] in the planning and production 
of the work" somehow indicate that "work performed" under 
paragraph 17 does not include preparatory work.  Id. at 1206 
(emphasis added).  These provisions, on their face, do not appear 
to support any such conclusion.  In addition, the district court 
determined that paragraphs 26, 29 and 35, which refer to the 
contractor's obligation to protect "work completed to date" and 
to the warranty as to "work done," support the conclusion that 
work performed under the termination for convenience clause does 
not include preparatory work.  Once again, if anything, these 
provisions merely beg the question of how to define "work" under 
  
paragraph 17 of the contract.  Finally, the court refers to 
paragraphs 7 and 31 that speak to obligations of the contractor 
before and shortly after "commencing work" under the contract.   
Unfortunately, these paragraphs also do not illuminate whether 
the parties considered preparatory work to constitute compensable 
work for purposes of the termination for convenience clause.17 
 Linan-Faye asks for the opportunity to present 
testimony and cross-examine witnesses concerning the intent of 
the parties in using the phrase "work performed" in paragraph 17 
of the contract.  Based on the evidence mustered by the district 
court, we cannot conclude that there is no dispute as to this 
issue.  Further, this issue is material to the question of what 
constitutes proper compensation under paragraph 17.  Therefore, 
Linan-Faye should be allowed to present the evidence that it 
feels is appropriate to determine the intent of the parties.  
Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment for HACC on this disputed issue. 
 
 B.  Evidence of Pre-Termination Expenses 
                     
17
.  The district court also refers, in a footnote, to letters 
exchanged between the parties that purportedly explain the 
understanding of the parties concerning the definition of "work 
performed."  The fact that the court goes beyond the contract and 
looks to these letters to reinforce its conclusion demonstrates 
the impropriety of granting summary judgment and the need to make 
such decisions on a more fully developed record.   
  
 Related to the disputed issue of the definition of 
"work performed" under the contract is the issue of whether 
Linan-Faye produced any evidence of pre-termination expenses 
compensable as "work-performed."  The district court determined 
that Linan-Faye "had presented no evidence of expenses that would 
merit an equitable adjustment to the contract."  Id. at 1208 
n.22.  Linan-Faye argues that the certification which it 
submitted in opposition to HACC's third motion for summary 
judgment provides the requisite evidence.  Linan-Faye is correct. 
 The district court, at this early stage of the 
litigation, improperly concluded that there was "no evidence" of 
expenses compensable under the termination for convenience 
clause.  Linan-Faye described 15 types of expenses that Linan-
Faye incurred preparing for work on the HACC contract.  
Certification of Norman Faye (October 21, 1993); App. at 231-33.  
While many of these "expenses" may not be compensable, some of 
the stated expenses, such as time spent "with municipal building, 
plumbing and electrical inspectors regarding job phasing, 
contract details, code requirements, and problem solving," may be 
compensable if the parties so intended under the termination for 
convenience clause of the contract.  Cf. ITT Defense 
Communications Division, Nos. 11858, 13439, 1970 ASBCA Lexis 29, 
at *56 (July 29, 1970) (cost of work done by appellant in 
preparing and submitting configurations that were never used 
still properly compensable under the termination for convenience 
  
clause); Navgas, Inc., No. 9240, 1964 ASBCA Lexis 1139, at *29 
(November 18, 1964) (costs of investigating work to be done, and 
determining the best way to perform the contract, if awarded, are 
properly compensable under termination for convenience clause).   
Although, on the whole, the evidence produced by Linan-Faye in 
this certification appears meager, by granting summary judgment 
for HACC the district court improvidently prevented the plaintiff 
from developing the record more fully.  There was not a complete 
lack of evidence.  Accordingly, we must reverse the grant of 
summary judgment on this issue and remand for trial. 
 In remanding for trial on this issue, however, it is 
important to explain precisely the scope of our holding.  We do 
not hold that Linan-Faye is entitled to pre-termination expenses 
that accrued as the result of any alleged pre-termination 
breaches of contract by HACC.  As the district court correctly 
held, cases that have addressed the issue of pre-termination 
breaches have concluded that claims for such damages are subsumed 
in the termination for convenience clause.  Linan-Faye 
Construction Co., 847 F. Supp. at 1203, 1204 (citing Nolan 
Brothers, Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1250 (Ct. Cl. 1969)); 
Descon System Ltd. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 410 (1984)).  Pre-
termination expenses that accrued as the result of any alleged 
pre-termination breaches by HACC are not compensable.  On remand, 
the triable issue is limited to a determination of the pre-
termination expenses which Linan-Faye incurred that the parties 
  
intended to be compensable as "work performed" under the 
termination for convenience clause of the contract. 
 
 C. Why HACC Retained Linan-Faye's Performance Bond 
 Linan-Faye next contends that the trial court 
improperly resolved a factual dispute as to why HACC retained 
Linan-Faye's performance bonds after terminating Linan-Faye.  
According to Linan-Faye, it is entitled to damages arising from 
HACC's failure to return this performance bond.  Linan-Faye 
alleges that by retaining its bond, HACC prevented it from 
accepting other construction contracts and used the bond as an 
inducement to force Linan-Faye to accept an unreasonable 
resolution of this dispute.  HACC argues that it retained Linan-
Faye's performance bond because Linan-Faye instituted a suit 
seeking specific performance and if Linan-Faye were successful, 
HACC would need Linan-Faye's bond. 
 This issue is not resolved solely by reference to the 
termination for convenience clause because the events that give 
rise to this claim occcured after termination.18  Recognizing 
                     
18
.  Linan-Faye argues that it is entitled to damages because of 
HACC's improper withholding of its performance bond both before 
and after termination.  Concerning Linan-Faye's claim for damages 
for pre-termination withholding of the bond, we agree with the 
district court that such damages are not recoverable because the 
termination for convenience clause controls and does not provide 
for such recovery.  Claims arising from events following 
termination, however, would not be governed by the termination 
for convenience clause. 
  
this, the district court decided the issue by concluding that 
keeping the bonds during the pendency of the litigation was the 
"logical response" to the plaintiff's lawsuit.  Linan-Faye 
Construction Co., 847 F. Supp. at 1205. 
 Unfortunately, there is no testimony or record evidence 
to support the conclusion that HACC engaged in the "logical 
response" posited by the district court.  No one from HACC ever 
indicated that it was Linan-Faye's suit for specific performance 
that prevented HACC from returning the bond.  Counsel for HACC 
simply raised this argument when the case took on a litigation 
posture.  This naked assertion by counsel, without record 
support, is not sufficient to warrant a grant of summary 
judgment.  
 The district court attempts to justify its decision to 
accept HACC's argument by referring to the September 25, 1990 
termination letter sent by Gregory Kern, the Interim Executive 
Director of HACC.  Nevertheless, its reasoning is unpersuasive.  
According to the court, Mr. Kern's letter which indicated that 
HACC would return the bonds was sent before Linan-Faye instituted 
suit.  Linan-Faye, 847 F. Supp. at 1205 n.16.  Therefore, the 
court reasoned, "[t]he decision of the HACC to depart from Mr. 
Kern's original plan only supports [the] finding that HACC felt 
compelled to hold onto the bonds until the Court had disposed of 
plaintiff's claims for specific performance." Id. (emphasis 
added).  The court in this passage, however, merely assumes its 
  
conclusion.  What eludes the district court is any evidence 
indicating that it was the suit for specific performance that 
caused retention of the bond.  In effect, what the district court 
stated is that the decision of HACC to depart from Kern's 
original plan supports HACC's decision to depart from Kern's 
original plan -- a statement without significance.  
 Moreover, even taking HACC's view of the timing of the 
relevant events, there was an unjustified gap of over one month 
between the time HACC terminated Linan-Faye and the time Linan-
Faye served its complaint seeking specific performance.  
According to HACC, after it issued its September 25, 1990 letter 
of termination, Linan-Faye sought reversal of HACC's decision to 
terminate.  HACC states that it sent a letter to Linan-Faye on 
October 23, 1990 confirming its decision to terminate.  Linan-
Faye did not serve its complaint for specific performance until 
early in December of 1990, however, and the bond had not yet been 
returned.  This unexcused delay strengthens Linan-Faye's argument 
that HACC did not decide to hold onto the performance bond as the 
result of the specific performance suit.  In light of these 
facts, we will reverse the district court's grant of summary 
judgment for HACC and remand for trial on this disputed issue.19  
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.  We recognize that Linan-Faye's complaint in this matter does 
not set forth a theory of recovery for damages due to improper 
retention of the performance bond following termination.  Indeed, 
the complaint could not set forth such a theory because the 
events giving rise to this aspect of Linan-Faye's claim (i.e., 
HACC's continued refusal to relinquish the bond during the 
pendency of the specific performance action) did not occur until 
  
 
 D.  Whether Linan-Faye "Refused" to Begin Work. 
 Linan-Faye asserts that the district court improperly 
found it "refused" to begin work.  According to Linan-Faye, it 
did not refuse to begin work, but merely wanted to agree on any 
changes that HACC desired before it began construction.  Linan-
Faye contends that there is no basis in the record for the 
district court's finding that it flatly refused to begin work. 
 We find that the question of whether Linan-Faye flatly 
refused to begin work is immaterial to this case.  Whether Linan-
(..continued) 
after the complaint was filed.  Nevertheless, the district court 
made findings on this issue.  Linan-Faye, 847 F. Supp. at 1205.  
Further, both parties briefed and argued the issue before this 
Court and HACC did not argue that the issue was not properly 
before the district court.  Accordingly, we find it appropriate 
to set forth the applicable theory of recovery on remand. 
 On remand, the theory upon which damages would be predicated 
is the common law action of detinue (or its modern counterpart).  
According to the New Jersey Supreme Court, "[t]he gist of the 
common law action of detinue was that [the] defendant originally 
had and acquired possession of the chattels lawfully, as by 
finding or bailment, but holds them subject to the plaintiff's 
superior right to immediate possession which has been asserted by 
a demand."  Baron v. Peoples National Bank of Secaucus, 9 N.J. 
249, 256, 87 A.2d 898, 901 (1952).  At common law, the 
appropriate remedy in a detinue action where property has been 
unlawfully detained is a judgment for the value of the property 
and damages in detention.  Id. 
 Here, HACC lawfully received Linan-Faye's performance bond 
pursuant to a contract between the parties.  Following 
termination, however, HACC's legal right to retain the bond is 
the subject of the dispute that must be resolved on remand.  If 
the jury were to find HACC liable for improper retention of the 
bond, the appropriate measure of damages would be compensation 
for jobs lost by Linan-Faye (after termination) that resulted 
from HACC's improper action. 
  
Faye actually "refused" to begin work would be relevant if it was 
necessary to decide if Linan-Faye defaulted on its obligations.   
The district court, however, based its holding on the doctrine of 
constructive termination for convenience.  Linan-Faye 
Construction Co., 847 F. Supp. at 1203.  The constructive 
termination for convenience doctrine makes the original reason 
for termination relevant only to the extent that it evidences the 
government's bad faith or a change in circumstances from the time 
of contracting.20  The issue of whether there was an actual 
default by Linan-Faye in refusing to begin work is immaterial.  
In this case the default termination is converted into a 
termination for convenience of the government by operation of 
law.  Since we agree with the district court that it was 
appropriate to apply the constructive termination for convenience 
doctrine, we hold that this issue is immaterial. 
 
 E.  Whether Linan-Faye Misunderstood the Specifications 
 Linan-Faye argues that the district court improperly 
concluded that it misunderstood the contract specifications 
because the court indicated in a footnote that "[a]t the very 
least, plaintiff misinterpreted the architect's specifications" 
for the project.  Linan-Faye Construction Co., 847 F. Supp. at 
1203 n.13.  According to Linan-Faye, it was HACC who 
                     
20
.  See infra Part V for analysis of the constructive 
termination for convenience doctrine. 
  
"misinterpreted" the contract specifications.  The dispute over 
proper interpretation of the contract specifications, argues 
Linan-Faye, prevented the court from resolving this issue at the 
summary judgment stage. 
 Linan-Faye's argument misinterprets the district 
court's reasoning.  The relevant statement the court made in this 
footnote is merely that there was discord between the parties 
over interpreting their agreement.  The district court mentioned 
the discord to support its conclusion concerning the constructive 
termination for convenience doctrine.  Whether Linan-Faye 
actually misunderstood the specifications, or whether it was 
HACC's misunderstanding, is irrelevant where there is a 
termination for convenience.  As the district court held, the 
constructive termination for convenience doctrine operates to 
allow the government to extricate itself from contractual 
relationships without arguing as to which party was in default.  
Id. at 1203.  Accordingly, the issue of who misunderstood the 
contract specifications is not material, and played no part in 
the order granting summary judgment. 
 
 F.  Whether HUD Approval was Necessary for Termination 
 Linan-Faye suggests that whether HUD approved a 
termination for convenience is a disputed issue that precludes 
summary judgment.  It concedes that HACC obtained HUD's general 
approval to terminate the contract, but argues that HUD never 
  
approved a termination for convenience.  Linan-Faye contends that 
HUD approval of a termination for convenience was a condition 
precedent to invoking that clause, and failure to obtain such 
approval precludes summary judgment.  Linan-Faye does not succeed 
in raising a disputed material issue on this point. 
 For the purposes of deciding this case, the district 
court did not assume that HACC originally terminated for 
convenience.  While there is a dispute as to whether the original 
letter of termination constituted a default termination or a 
termination for convenience, HACC prevails under the district 
court's reasoning without having to prove that it obtained HUD 
approval of a termination for convenience.  The court proceeded 
on a constructive termination for convenience theory.  Linan-Faye 
does not dispute that HUD had approved HACC's right to terminate 
generally.  Thus, concerning the original termination, HACC 
fulfilled its obligations by informing HUD, and obtaining from 
HUD a general approval for the termination of the contract.  
Because HACC received general HUD approval to terminate, there is 
no bar to this court's using the constructive termination for 
convenience doctrine to convert this into a termination for 
convenience by operation of law.  Further, and most importantly, 
there is simply no dispute as to the material facts of what 
approval HACC obtained.  Indeed, both parties concede that HACC 
obtained HUD approval to terminate generally, but did not obtain 
specific HUD approval of a termination for convenience.  
  
Therefore, this cannot be a disputed factual issue as Linan-Faye 
erroneously contends.  
 Accordingly, we will reverse the district court's grant 
of summary judgment and remand for trial on the issues of: (1) 
the definition of "work performed" under paragraph 17 of the 
contract; (2) the pre-termination expenses incurred by Linan-Faye 
that are compensable as "work performed" under the termination 
for convenience clause; and (3)  HACC's possible liability for 
damages resulting from its retaining Linan-Faye's bond after 
termination.   
 
 VII. SECTION 1983 
 Linan-Faye next asserts that the district court erred 
in granting summary judgment against it on its claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.  Linan-Faye argues it has a protectible property 
interest in its contract with HACC that is entitled to Fourteenth 
and Fifth Amendment protection.  Further, Linan-Faye contends 
that HACC's retention of its performance bond implicates a 
liberty interest entitled to constitutional protection.  In 
granting summary judgment, the district court held that whatever 
property interest Linan-Faye may have had, it does not rise to a 
sufficient level of certainty or dependency to merit 
constitutional protection.  Linan-Faye Construction Co. v. 
Housing Authority of Camden, 797 F. Supp. 376, 380 (D.N.J. 1992). 
  
 We agree with the district court's resolution of this 
matter.  This Court recently surveyed the law concerning 
Fourteenth Amendment claims based on contracts with state 
entities.  Unger v. National Residents Matching Program, 928 F.2d 
1392 (3d Cir. 1991).  We stated in Unger that it is beyond 
dispute today that a contract with a state entity can give rise 
to a property right protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Id. at 1397 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-601, 
92 S. Ct. 2694, 2698-2700 (1972)).  Nevertheless, we stated that 
the Supreme Court has never held that every state contract gives 
rise to such a protectible property interest.  Id. 
 As we explained in Unger, relevant Supreme Court cases 
and cases from other courts of appeals instruct that two general 
types of contract rights are recognized as property protected 
under the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) where "the contract confers a 
protected status, such as those `characterized by a quality of 
either extreme dependence in the case of welfare benefits, or 
permanence in the case of tenure, or sometimes both, as 
frequently occurs in the case of social security benefits'"; or 
(2) where "the contract itself includes a provision that the 
state entity can terminate the contract only for cause."  Id. at 
1399 (citing S & D Maintenance Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962, 966-
67 (2d Cir 1988)).  In Unger, a physician licensed to practice 
medicine in Pennsylvania was admitted into Temple University 
Hospital's dermatology residency program through the National 
  
Resident Matching Program.  Id. at 1393.  Shortly before Unger 
was to begin the program, she received a letter stating that the 
University had decided to discontinue the program.  Id.  Unger 
filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Id. 
 Declaring that the contract in Unger did not fall into 
either of the two protected categories, we dismissed Unger's § 
1983 claim.  Id. at 1402.  We relied in part on the reasoning of 
our previous decision in Reich v. Beharry, 883 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 
1989), where we stated: 
 Many . . . courts have observed that if every breach of 
contract by someone acting under color of state law 
constituted a deprivation of property for procedural 
due process purposes, the federal courts would be 
called upon to pass judgment on the procedural fairness 
of the processing of a myriad of contract claims 
against public entities.  We agree that such a 
wholesale federalization of state public contract law 
seems far afield from the great purposes of the due 
process clause. 
Reich, 883 F.2d at 242 (citations omitted). 
 Linan-Faye's contract with HACC does not fall into 
either of the two categories we delineated in Unger.  The 
contract does not confer a protected status on the plaintiff and 
the state entity could terminate the contract for reasons other 
than for cause.  Indeed, it could be terminated for convenience.  
To grant Linan-Faye a remedy under § 1983 would create the 
wholesale federalization of state public contract law that 
concerned us in Unger and Reich.  Accordingly, the district court 
  
did not err in granting summary judgment for HACC on Linan-Faye's 
claim. 
 Turning to Linan-Faye's assertion that it has been 
deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, we 
also find that the district court did not err in granting summary 
judgment for HACC.  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
addressed a case factually similar to the one at hand in S & D 
Maintenance Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1988).  In that 
case, a contractor brought a § 1983 claim against the City of New 
York, claiming that the City's withholding of payments under a 
contract to maintain parking meters resulted in the contractor 
being left with insufficient capital to pursue other work.  Id. 
at 963, 970.  The court held that although the consequential 
damages of an alleged breach may be severe, this fact alone 
cannot convert a contract claim into a deprivation of liberty.  
Id. at 970.  We agree with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, and conclude that Linan-Faye fails to 
establish a claim of constitutional magnitude.  We will affirm 
the district court's grant of summary judgment to HACC on Linan-
Faye's § 1983 claim.   
 
 VIII. ESTOPPEL CLAIMS 
 Linan-Faye's final contention is that HACC is precluded 
from refusing to pay compensation by reason of principles of 
equitable and judicial estoppel.  Linan-Faye argues that HACC 
  
could have terminated for convenience in 1988 but that it did 
not, and it breached a duty of fairness by waiting two years 
before deciding to terminate.  Linan-Faye relies on a single 
case, M. & O. Disposal Co. v. Township of Middletown, 100 N.J. 
Super. 558, 242 A.2d 841 (A.D. 1967), aff'd, 52 N.J. 6, 242 A.2d 
841 (1968), to support its equitable estoppel argument.  
Additionally, Linan-Faye argues that because HACC asserted in 
prior judicial proceedings that there would be a "defined measure 
of damages" under the termination for convenience clause, HACC is 
now judicially estopped from arguing that it owes Linan-Faye 
nothing. 
 We find Linan-Faye's equitable estoppel claim 
unpersuasive. HACC could have terminated for convenience in 1988, 
but it also could have pursued completion of the contract 
according to its terms.  HACC's decision to terminate after an 
inability to agree to such terms does not breach a duty of 
fairness.  Indeed, this termination was within HACC's rights 
under the contract and, as explained above, the constructive 
termination for convenience doctrine allows HACC to convert its 
original termination into a termination for convenience. 
 Moreover, Linan-Faye's reliance on M. & O. Disposal is 
misplaced.  That case involved the question of whether a 
municipality impliedly ratified a contract for extra work which 
was outside the scope of contract to dispose of garbage.  Id. at 
560, 567, 242 A.2d at 841, 846.  In that case, the New Jersey 
  
court merely stated the general precept that equitable principles 
of estoppel will be applied against municipalities where the 
interests of justice, morality, or common fairness clearly 
dictate this course.  Id. at 567, 242 A.2d at 846.  Beyond the 
obvious fact that the timing problem presented here has almost 
nothing to do with the ratification issue presented in M. & O. 
Disposal, Linan-Faye has failed to demonstrate how HACC's 
exercise of its rights under this contract violates principles of 
justice, morality, or common fairness.  Thus, we find Linan-
Faye's equitable estoppel argument unconvincing.   
 Linan-Faye's argument for judicial estoppel is also 
unpersuasive.  Judicial estoppel precludes a party from assuming 
a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously 
asserted to the prejudice of an adverse party.  Brown v. Allied 
Plumbing & Heating Co., 129 N.J.L. 442, 446, 30 A.2d 290, 292 
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd 130 N.J.L. 487, 33 A.2d 813 (E. & A. 1943); 
Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc., 243 N.J. Super. 590, 620, 581 
A.2d 91, 107 (A.D. 1990) (citations omitted), aff'd, 124 N.J. 
520, 591 A.2d 943 (1991).  There is no inconsistency in taking 
the position that HACC took in prior proceedings.  HACC merely 
argued that the termination for convenience clause provided the 
defined measure of damages.  After the district court decided the 
difficult question of whether the termination for convenience 
clause defines the measure of damages, it was not only 
appropriate, but necessary, for HACC to address the question of 
  
what the measure of damages is under that clause.  At this later 
stage, HACC may contend that this clause provides no compensation 
for Linan-Faye in this instance.  The attempt by Linan-Faye to 
describe a contradiction in HACC's legal position has no force 
under the facts presented in this case.  
 
 IX. CONCLUSION 
 In sum, we find that the district court erred in its 
decision to apply federal common law and not the law of New 
Jersey to resolve this dispute.  Applying New Jersey law, we will 
reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment and remand 
for trial on the issues of material fact that are in dispute.  
The three issues that remain in dispute in this case are the 
definition of "work performed" under paragraph 17 of the 
contract, whether and to what extent Linan-Faye incurred 
preparatory expenses prior to termination that are compensable as 
"work performed" under paragraph 17, and HACC's possible 
liability for damages resulting from its withholding of Linan-
Faye's performance bond after termination.  Finally, we will 
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
HACC on Linan-Faye's § 1983 claim. 
  
Linan-Faye Construction Co., Inc. v. Housing Authority of the 
City of Camden, No. 94-5193. 
BECKER, Circuit Judge, Concurring and Dissenting. 
 I join in Parts I, II, and III of the majority opinion.  
However, I dissent from Part IV because I do not agree that New 
Jersey would apply to this garden variety construction dispute 
between a builder and a local governmental agency precepts drawn 
from a potpourri of federal cases which amount at best to a hodge 
podge, and at worst to a regime so inhospitable and unfair to 
small contractors who deal with government agencies as to be 
inconsistent with New Jersey jurisprudence.  Rather, I believe 
that New Jersey would apply its own law, which would not 
recognize the doctrine of "constructive termination for 
convenience" but rather would apply the normal rule of contract 
breach which, on this record, would unquestionably render HACC 
liable.  Moreover, even if the New Jersey Supreme Court were to 
assimilate federal law, I do not think that it would read that 
law in the matter predicted by the majority.  The precepts that 
the majority applies are gleaned from cases that have been 
excoriated in critical commentary because they are in 
considerable measure poorly reasoned.  
 I also find myself unable to join in Part VII, dealing 
with Linan-Faye's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.  I cannot agree with 
the majority that HACC's arguably improper retention of Linan-
Faye's performance bond, which the company requires in order to 
  
engage in any business, did not impair Linan-Faye's liberty 
interest.  I do, however, join the majority with respect to its 
rejection of Linan-Faye's property interest claim.21   
 
 I.  WHAT LAW WOULD NEW JERSEY APPLY? 
 The majority, notwithstanding the considerable 
authority of the Dobson case, supra Maj. Op. at 13, reasons that 
because there are no cases in New Jersey construing the effect of 
termination for convenience clauses, "courts in New Jersey would 
recognize that where the parties have incorporated a particular 
clause pursuant to federal regulation, they do so against the 
backdrop of federal case law addressing the clause," and hence 
would adopt federal law, whatever that may be.  That is the sum 
and substance of the majority's argument.  It is, I suggest, 
pretty "thin soup," neither documented nor reasoned. 
 The majority's prediction also ignores the facts that 
should govern the analysis required in such circumstances.  A 
review of the facts Linan-Faye has advanced and supported in 
connection with the summary judgment motion -- which are glossed 
over by the majority -- will illuminate the correct prediction of 
New Jersey law.  At this stage, these facts must obviously be 
                     
21
.  I take no position on Parts VI.B through F and VIII of the 
majority opinion, as they are outside the ambit of this effort, 
except to note that the discussion of HACC's delay in invoking 
the termination for convenience clause, see Part VIII, supports 
my views insofar as it highlights the dubiousness of HACC's ex 
post reliance thereon.   
  
viewed in the light most favorable to Linan-Faye, the non-moving 
party.  See Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d 
Cir. 1976). 
 
A.  The Facts Viewed in the Light 
Most Favorable to Linan-Faye 
 It is undisputed that the parties had a binding 
$4,264,000 contract for the rehabilitation of 244 housing units.  
Linan-Faye, with declarations cognizable in summary judgment 
proceedings: (1) represents itself to be an experienced, highly 
regarded contractor that was ready, willing, and able to perform 
the job in a timely fashion; (2) states that through 
incompetence, poor planning, or other contractors' delay, the 
HACC failed or refused to give Linan-Faye even a Notice to 
Proceed for a full year; and (3) submits that after finally 
giving that Notice, HACC then proceeded, without justification, 
to delay Linan-Faye for almost another year.  Linan-Faye also 
represents that HACC never supplied Linan-Faye with a list of 
which vacant units to work on; that turmoil reigned at HACC as 
the Executive Director was replaced by a new Acting Executive 
Director, Gregory Kern, in July 1990; and that Kern decided to 
"clean house" by, inter alia, summarily terminating Linan-Faye's 
contract.   
 It is also undisputed that in the course of the 
termination dialogue, HACC never suggested that the termination 
  
was "for convenience."  All the discussion and written notices 
instead alleged contractor default, which Linan-Faye staunchly 
denied.  Moreover, whether or not it was legally required, HACC 
never got HUD approval to terminate for convenience.  Indeed, 
HACC did not invoke the termination for convenience clause until 
two years after termination, when the litigation began.  Most 
importantly, during the period from September 1988 through August 
1991, HACC held Linan-Faye's performance bonds, effectively 
precluding Linan-Faye from bidding any other significant work.   
Linan-Faye has proffered evidence that it suffered damages of 
$1,492,000 as a result of HACC's breach of the contract and a 
further loss of $1,249,999 from its inability to use its bonding 
line.   
 
 B.  General New Jersey Contract Law Principles 
 Under general common law contract principles, 
applicable in New Jersey and elsewhere, one who breaches a 
contract must compensate the injured non-breaching party so as to 
put it in the position it would have occupied had performance 
been rendered as promised.  Donovan v. Bachstadt, 453 A.2d 160, 
165 (N.J. 1982); 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 992 (1951).  
A court in a breach of contract case aims to fashion a remedy in 
order to compensate the non-breaching party fully.  Donovan, 453 
A.2d at 165; 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 992 (1951).   
  
 The New Jersey courts have long maintained a liberal 
rule that non-breaching parties are entitled to damages.  Cf. In 
re Merritt Logan, Inc., 901 F.2d 349, 357 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(interpreting New Jersey contract damages law); Sandler v. Lawn-
A-Mat Chem.& Equip. Corp., 358 A.2d 805, 814 (N.J. Super. Ct.  
App. Div.), cert. denied, 366 A.2d 658 (N.J. 1976) (non-breaching 
party "presumptively" entitled to damages, with doubts resolved 
against the breaching party).  New Jersey courts have also 
narrowly construed clauses that tend to restrict a party's right 
to recover its full common law damages.  See American Sanitary 
Sales Co. v. State, 429 A.2d 403, 407 (N.J. Super. App. Div.), 
cert. denied, 434 A.2d 1094 (N.J. 1981) (narrowly interpreting a 
"no damage for delay" clause in a New Jersey state contract).   
 The reluctance of the New Jersey Courts to give 
expansive effect to exculpatory clauses extends to cases 
involving its own government agencies.  See, e.g., Buckley & Co., 
Inc. v. State, 356 A.2d 56, 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975); 
Ace Stone, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 221 A.2d 515, 518-19 (N.J. 
1966); American Sanitary Sales Co., 429 A.2d at 407; see also 
Department of Transp. v. Arapaho Constr., Inc., 357 S.E.2d 593, 
594-95 (Ga. 1987) (relying in part on Ace Stone).  Moreover, 
under New Jersey law there is a presumption against finding a 
contractual intent to alter common law rights and remedies.  See, 
e.g., Gibraltar Factors Corp. v. Slapo, 125 A.2d 309, 310 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1956) (parties presumed to contract with 
  
reference to existing law), aff'd, 129 A.2d 567 (N.J. 1957), 
appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 13 (1957); see also Rescigno v. 
Picinich, 377 A.2d 733, 739 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977) 
(applying a presumption against a statutory intent to alter 
common law rights); Blackman v. Iles, 71 A.2d 633, 636 (N.J. 
1950) (same).  Indeed, New Jersey courts commonly award 
contractors common law contract damages against the State, 
including damages for delay.  See, e.g., American Sanitary Sales 
Co., 429 A.2d at 407; Buckley & Co., 356 A.2d at 65 (see also 
cases cited therein). 
 
 C.  New Jersey and the Federal Law Alternative 
 This is not the first case in which a court applying 
New Jersey law has had to adjudicate a contract dispute with some 
federal connection.  In Edward J. Dobson, Jr., Inc. v. Rutgers, 
384 A.2d 1121 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978), aff'd sub nom. 
Broadway Maintenance Corp. v. Rutgers, 434 A.2d 1125 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1981), aff'd, 447 A.2d 906 (N.J. 1982), plaintiff-
contractors sought to avoid the impact of a "no-damage for delay" 
clause by asserting their claim for delay as an "equitable 
adjustment."  The court traced the history of the "equitable 
adjustment" provisions in federal construction contracts and 
federal regulations.  But the court refused to import this wholly 
federal concept into the New Jersey law of public construction 
  
contracts.  Finding that the term "equitable adjustment" had 
become a term of art in federal contracts, the court held: 
 The policy factors that have lead [sic] to 
the development of this concept in federal 
contracts, such as a need to expand or 
abandon a particular arms program with 
consequent economic impact on contractors and 
subcontractors, do not warrant state courts 
adopting it wholesale by judicial fiat when 
traditional remedies for breach of contract 
are available.  Id. at 1153 n.10. 
This holding was affirmed by both the intermediate appellate 
court and Supreme Court of New Jersey and strongly suggests that 
New Jersey courts would not import the federal concept of 
constructive termination for convenience into its public 
construction contracts jurisprudence.  
 As the majority correctly points out, because there is 
no reported New Jersey precedent interpreting a "termination for 
convenience" clause, it is the function of this court to predict 
how the New Jersey Supreme Court would rule if confronted with 
this issue.  In my view, there is no reason to believe that that 
court, if called upon to resolve the question, would jettison a 
century of settled contract law supporting liberal contract 
remedies and narrowly construing similar exculpatory provisions 
in order to adopt a harsh -- and harshly criticized, see infra -- 
federal interpretation of the clause at issue here.  In this 
case, the retroactive application of this dramatic change in the 
law imposed by the majority to the factual scenario described 
above not only exacerbates the harshness of the result but also 
  
increases my confidence that the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
never have adopted this interpretation. 
  
D.  The Termination of Convenience Provision and Its 
Harsh Construction by the Majority 
 The termination for convenience clause has, as the 
majority explains, a long lineage, dating from the Civil War era.  
During that era federal government contracting was attended by 
much impropriety and scandal.  See generally CARL SANDBURG, ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN, THE WAR YEARS (1948).  The modern (post-1970) incarnation 
of the clause is ensconced in the Code of Federal Regulations: 
 If the contractor can establish, or if it is 
otherwise determined that the contractor was 
not in default or that the failure to perform 
is excusable; i.e., arose out of causes 
beyond the control and without the fault or 
negligence of the contractor, the [prescribed 
default clauses] provide that a termination 
for default will be considered to have been a 
termination for the convenience of the 
Government . . . . 
Federal Acquisition Regulations ("FAR's"), 48 C.F.R. § 49.401(b) 
(1993).  The FAR's apply to direct United States government 
procurement (including HUD procurement).  They do not apply to 
grants of federal funds to local public housing authorities.  The 
district court acknowledged this undisputed point.  (Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 18 n.7) 
 Moreover, regulations that govern grants to local 
housing agencies contain their own specific scheme and procedures 
for federally funded contracts made by state and local housing 
  
authorities that are separate and distinct from the FAR's.  These 
"CIAP" requirements mandate a variety of terms and provisions 
that must be set forth in such contracts, including a termination 
for convenience clause.  See 24 C.F.R. § 85.36(i)(2).  In 
contrast to the FAR's, however, the Administrative Requirements 
for CIAP Grants do not include any counterpart to the automatic 
conversion language of 48 C.F.R. § 49.401(b), or the other 
specific termination provisions found in HUD's own FAR's.  This 
is consistent with the mandate of the CIAP enabling statute, 
which is designed to allow the housing authority grantees maximum 
discretion and individualized judgment.  42 U.S.C.S. § 14371(e)E, 
(e)(4)(D) (1994). 
 The absence of an express conversion clause in the 
Administrative Requirements for Grants is significant because, 
under the venerable maxim of statutory construction, expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius, the inclusion of one is the 
exclusion of another.  As I see it, the exclusion of an automatic 
conversion provision in the Requirements for Public Housing 
Authority Contracts (when specifically included in HUD's own 
FAR's) expresses an intent to exclude such a provision, unless 
local PHA administrators choose to include it.  Cf. Marshall v. 
Western Union Tel. Co., 621 F.2d 1246, 1251 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(refusing to apply a Department of Labor standard in one 
subsection of a regulation where it had been excluded when it was 
included elsewhere); SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 31.06 (4th 
  
ed.).  Moreover, without the conversion clause, HACC's initial 
failure to allege that it was terminating the contract with 
Linan-Faye for convenience prevents HACC from subsequently 
embracing that argument. 
 Before contracts with the federal government included 
automatic conversion clauses, courts did not permit government 
agencies to use the termination for convenience clauses to escape 
from a breach.  In Klein v. United States, 285 F.2d 778 (Ct. Cl. 
1961), for example, the Court of Claims rejected the government's 
argument that, because it had a contractual right to terminate 
for convenience, its illegal breach of contract should be 
disregarded.  Id. at 784.  Accord Goldwasser v. United States, 
325 F.2d 722, 725 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Dynalectron Corp. v. United 
States, 518 F.2d 594, 604 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Torncello v. United 
States, 681 F.2d 756, 771-72 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Rogerson Aircraft 
Corp. v. Fairchild Indus.Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1494, 1499 (C.D. Cal. 
1986) (changed circumstances required). 
 The problems confronted by government contracting 
officers operating under the Klein rule resulted in the adoption 
of the automatic conversion clause by regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 
49.401(b).  The clause now appears in most direct federal 
government procurement contracts.  However, as the Rogerson court 
noted in footnote 5 of its opinion, where the "automatic 
conversion clause" is not made part of the contract, either 
expressly or by regulation, the Klein rule remains fully 
  
applicable and bars the implication of such clause.  Rogerson, 
632 F. Supp. at 1500 n.5.  Although the contract in Rogerson 
appears more specific than the instant contract in its 
requirement that the agency elect its basis for termination 
(i.e., default or convenience), the Rogerson decision remains 
important and persuasive.  Without a conversion clause, HACC 
cannot invoke the termination for convenience provision to cure 
its improper default termination.  And a wrongful termination for 
default constitutes a breach of the contract entitling the 
wrongly terminated subcontractor to state law damages for the 
breach, including lost profits.  Id. at 1500-01; Clay Bernard 
Sys. Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 804, 810-11 (1991) 
(holding that absent a "conversion clause" a wrongful termination 
for default is a breach, entitling contractor to recovery under 
federal procurement law). 
 But even if HACC had initially invoked its termination 
for convenience clause, thus avoiding the issue of the absence of 
a conversion clause, HACC could not avoid liability in this case.  
The majority acknowledges that the case law construing the 
termination for convenience clause has retrenched from its high 
water mark.  While the majority's discussion does not clearly 
depict the current state of the law, the leading cases appear to 
hold that government agencies can only invoke the clause where 
there has been some change in the circumstances of the parties.  
See Torncello, 681 F.2d at 772.  The majority holds that a 
  
deterioration in business relations, demonstrated in not 
insignificant part by a dispute over specifications, constitutes 
such a change in circumstances.  In my view, such a rule would 
largely eviscerate the limitation.  As lawyers who have dealt 
with construction disputes know, these contracts almost always 
generate some dispute over specifications, and any construction 
dispute rancorous enough to spawn litigation will almost 
certainly have led to the requisite deterioration in business 
relations.  The facts of this case illustrate how circular a 
deterioration-of-business-relations test can be, for HACC did not 
even attempt to invoke the clause until litigation began. 
 The majority constructs a regime under which a dispute 
arising out of a garden variety contract between a builder and a 
local housing authority, which is not a federal government 
contract but only a local agency contract to which certain 
federal regulations apply, has been severed from its common law 
roots.  The majority's application of selected federal cases 
renders these local agency contracts virtually illusory by giving 
an arguably defaulting local agency the right to avoid its own 
breach, and sharply limit its liability simply by incanting the 
termination for convenience clause two years after the fact.  In 
my view, it is inconceivable that the New Jersey Supreme Court, 
which has so consistently supported liberal awards of contract 
damages, would countenance that result, especially in the fact 
scenario at bar. 
  
 This conclusion is strongly buttressed by the scathing 
criticism that has been levied at Torncello and the cognate 
jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Stephen N. Young, Note, Limiting the 
Government's Ability To Terminate for Convenience Following 
Tornecello, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 892 (1984) (suggesting that the 
Torncello decision provides a reason to eliminate the 
government's ability to terminate for convenience entirely). 
 Because I do not believe that the New Jersey Supreme 
Court would adopt the federal interpretation but would instead 
continue to give exculpatory clauses such as the termination for 
convenience clause only narrow -- if any -- effect, I dissent.22 
 
 
 II.  THE § 1983 CLAIM 
 I also dissent from the majority's affirmance of the 
summary judgment granted on Linan-Faye's § 1983 claim.  While I 
agree that Linan-Faye's interest in the contract did not rise to 
a property interest protected by the Constitution, I cannot agree 
that HACC's unjustified retention of Linan-Faye's performance 
bond did not deprive Linan-Faye of a protected liberty interest.  
 The majority dismisses Linan-Faye's claim rather 
summarily, overlooking precedent which would, in my view, require 
                     
22
.  As my discussion explains, I believe that this result would 
follow even if New Jersey were to look to federal law, for I do 
not think New Jersey would read federal law so expansively as 
does the majority. 
  
reversal.  The right to follow a chosen profession free from 
unreasonable interference comes within both the liberty and 
property concepts of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  See 
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959); Piecknick v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1259 (3d Cir. 1994); 
Bernard v. United Township High Sch. Dist. No. 30, 5 F.3d 1090, 
1092 (7th Cir. 1993).  It is true that the Constitution protects 
only the right "to pursue a calling or occupation, and not the 
right to a specific job."  Bernard, 5 F.3d at 1092 (quoting 
Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 f.2d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 
1992)).  Nevertheless, the majority and the sole case on which it 
relies, S & D Maintenance Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 
1988), fail to consider how disputes over specific jobs can, 
under certain circumstances, affect a party's pursuit of its 
occupation.   
 In S & D, although the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit framed the § 1983 claim as one challenging the 
plaintiff's dismissal from government employment, which clearly 
did not rise to a constitutional violation, the true basis of the 
plaintiff's liberty claim was that New York City's refusal to pay 
amounts already due had essentially forced the company out of 
business and left it "tottering near bankruptcy, unable to get 
work, as a direct result of the city's alleged breach of the 
contracts and withholding of payments."  S & D, 844 F.2d at 970.  
While I believe that S & D may be in error to the extent it 
  
denies that the plaintiff's claim implicated a protected liberty 
interest, the instant case provides an even stronger claim.  
Whereas the city defendant in S & D could argue that the 
plaintiff was not entitled to the amounts that it alleged it had 
already earned, HACC cannot make any such argument about its 
(arguably unjustified) failure to return Linan-Faye's own 
performance bond.  Also, when HACC interfered with Linan-Faye's 
(pre-existing) capacity to obtain large construction contracts, 
the core of its business, it brought this case into close 
resemblance to those cases where the state actors are held liable 
under § 1983 for revoking or interfering substantially with a 
person's license to pursue a chosen occupation.  Cf. Herz v. 
Degnan, 648 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding violation of a 
property interest in the revocation of a professional license).   
 Without the use of its bonding line, Linan-Faye was 
paralyzed:  It could not bid on any significant contracts and 
thus could not replace the business lost through the government's 
breach.  Hence, because HACC's arguably unjustified retention of 
the bond did impinge on protected liberty interests, the district 
court erred by awarding the defendant summary judgment on this 
claim.  I therefore also dissent from the portion of the majority 
opinion that affirms this ruling. 
